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Most of Econ 101 Is Right
Noah Smith doesn't even try to argue otherwise
Friday, November 27, 2015
 David R. Henderson
Economics  Basic  Welfare  Minimum Wage  Employment
conomist Noah Smith has a recent article titled “Most of What
You Learned in Econ 101 Is Wrong.” He doesn’t actually make
the case that would support that title. But he also probably didn’t
choose the title. However, he did choose this statement:
But [N. Gregory] Mankiw’s book, like every introductory econ
textbook I know of, has a big problem. Most of what’s in it is
probably wrong.
Here’s what’s striking: In an article that purports to show that
Mankiw is wrong on many issues, he doesn’t point out how he’s
wrong on any issues.
Moreover, he doesn’t even try. At no point in his piece, does Smith
ever relate anything he says to specific things that Mankiw claimed.
Of course, it’s possible that Smith doesn’t think he needs to do so
because he takes as given that his audience knows what’s in
Mankiw’s text.
So let’s look at that. On the minimum wage, Smith writes:
For example, Econ 101 theory tells us that minimum wage policies
should have a harmful impact on employment. Basic supply and
demand analysis says that in a free market, wages adjust so that
everyone who wants a job has a job — supply matches demand.
Less productive workers earn less, but they are still employed.
If you set a price floor — a lower limit on what employers are
allowed to pay — then it will suddenly become un-economical for
companies to retain all the workers whose productivity is lower
than that price floor. In other words, minimum wage hikes should
quickly put a bunch of low-wage workers out of a job.
And Smith gives his criticism in the next paragraph:
That’s theory. Reality, it turns out, is very different. In the last two
decades, empirical economists have looked at a large number of
minimum wage hikes, and concluded that in most cases, the
immediate effect on employment is very small. It’s only in the
long run that minimum wages might start to make a big
difference.
In other words, in most cases there is a small, presumably negative,
effect on employment. And presumably in the other cases there is a
large effect. How, exactly, does this contradict the claims that
Mankiw makes and that many of us teach in our equivalents of Econ
101? It doesn’t.
Now it is true that in the 5th edition (2009) of his text, Mankiw writes:
Although there is some debate about how much the minimum
wage affects unemployment, the typical study finds that a 10
percent increase in the minimum wage depresses teenage
employment [by] between 1 and 3 percent.
In light of the more recent studies that Smith is referring to, Mankiw
might need to soften that statement. But he need not change his
conclusion that the minimum wage puts some teenagers out of
work. So Smith, in an article purporting to disagree with Mankiw on
this, finds himself agreeing.
The other issue on which Smith takes issue with how Econ 101 is
taught — or is it Mankiw’s text? — is on welfare. Smith writes:
Another example is welfare. Econ 101 theory tells us that welfare
gives people an incentive not to work. If you subsidize leisure,
simple theory says you will get more of it.
What’s Smith’s objection? He writes:
But recent empirical studies have shown that such effects are
usually very small. Occasionally, welfare programs even make
people work more. For example, a study in Uganda found that
grants for poor people looking to improve their skills resulted in
people working much more than before.
But here he’s attacking a straw man. Economists who have claimed
that welfare discourages work have generally had in mind welfare
programs that impose a very high implicit marginal tax rate because
the people on welfare lose a lot of their welfare payments when they
work more.
Go to the link he cites and you find that he’s talking about the kind
of welfare is typically in the form of unrestricted cash grants that,
presumably, they don’t lose if they work more. That means that such
welfare programs do not — repeat do not — subsidize leisure.
That certainly doesn’t contradict the standard exposition in Econ 101
or the exposition in Mankiw’s text. Mankiw discusses a hypothetical
welfare program in which the government guarantees an annual
income of $15,000 and then takes away one dollar of welfare for
every dollar earned. He writes:
The incentive effects of this policy are obvious: Any person who
would make under $15,000 by working has little incentive to find
and keep a job.
Why? Mankiw explains:
In effect the government taxes 100 percent of additional
earnings.
Do the studies the linked article that Smith cites contradict this? No.
In fact, here’s what the linked article states:
There’s no doubt that poorly designed social programs can deter
work. Aid to Families With Dependent Children, the pre-welfare
reform welfare program, was found to decrease hours worked by
10 to 50 percent among recipients; that likely has something to
do with the fact that AFDC benefits were taken away at a rate of
100 percent, so every dollar earned on the job was a dollar not
received from AFDC. Who would work under that condition?
Exactly.
H/T to Don Boudreaux.
Cross-posted from Econlog.
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